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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TRACY D. WAGNER and ROBERT W.
WAGNER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 20030106-CA

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, and UTAH STATE
DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
Defendants-Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I:

THE RESTATEMENT AND TIEDE ARE CONSISTENT WITH
MATHESON. AND UNDER ALL THREE, A BATTERY
REQUIRES AN INTENT TO HARM IN ADDITION TO AN
INTENT TO CAUSE A CONTACT.

Regarding the elements of assault and battery, the Wagners and the State agree that
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 13 and 21 (1965) and Tiede v. State Department of
Corrections. 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996), are controlling. But contrary to what the State
argues, the Restatement and Tiede require not just an intent to cause contact, but also an
intent to cause harm. Both the Restatement and Tiede define assault and battery as acts
intended "to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other." Restatement
1

(Second) of Torts, §§ 13 and 21; Tiede at 503 n.3. The State, when quoting that language,
emphasizes the word "contact," ignoring the words "harmful or offensive" just before it.
The Restatement and Tiede don't say "intending to cause contact," they say "intending to
cause harmful contact."
The Restatement and Tiede are consistent with, and reinforce, Matheson v. Pearson,
619 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980), in which the throwing of a tootsie pop at a person, which was a
deliberate act intended to cause contact, was held not to be a battery because it was not
intended to cause harm. That is the same thing required by the Restatement—not just an
intent to cause a contact, but intent "to cause a harmful contact." The Restatement simply
"restates" the common law, including Matheson and cases like it. Nothing in the
Restatement invalidates Matheson.
Tiede likewise is not invalidated by the Restatement. In Tiede, the issue was whether
the State is immune from negligence actions for deaths, as opposed to nonfatal injuries,
arising out of assault or battery.

Tiede, 915 P.2d at 502. The Court, quoting the

Restatement §§13 and 21 in a footnote, noted that the cause of the deaths in that case, a
shooting, was assault and battery. IcL at 503 n. 3. But that was not in dispute. The plaintiffs
did not allege that the shooting was anything other than an assault or battery. They did not
allege that it was unintentional. The Court did not reach the issue of whether intent to cause
a contact without intent to cause harm is enough to constitute an assault or battery, because
it was never raised. Thus, Tiede did not adopt an intent-to-cause-contact-only standard as
suggested by the State. On the contrary, in quoting the Restatement, which requires intent
"to cause a harmful or offensive contact," Tiede confirms that assault and battery require

2

intent to harm in addition to intent to cause a contact. Rather than replacing Matheson.
Tiede reinforces it.
The requirement of intent to harm is neither outdated nor based on criminal law. The
Colorado Supreme Court recently applied the rule in a civil case which involved a mentally
disabled defendant. In White v. Muniz. 999 P.2d 814 (Colo. 2000), an elderly woman who
suffered from senile dementia struck her caregiver who then sued the elderly woman for
assault and battery. The caregiver objected to a jury instruction given at trial which raised
the issue of "whether an intentional tort requires some proof that the tortfeasor not only
intended to contact another person, but also intended that the contact be harmful or offensive
to the other person." Id. at 816.
Citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 8 (5th ed.
1984) and Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 30 (2000), and quoting the Restatement, the
Colorado Supreme Court first noted that "[s]tate courts and legal commentators generally
agree that an intentional tort requires some proof that the tortfeasor intended harm or
offense." 999 P.2d at 816. Ultimately the court held that "the law of Colorado requires the
jury to conclude that the defendant both intended the contact and intended it to be harmful
or offensive." IdL at 818. The court further explained that
A jury can, of course, find a mentally deficient person
liable for an intentional tort, but in order to do so, the jury must
find that the actor intended offensive or harmful consequences.
As a result, insanity is not a defense to an intentional tort
according to the ordinary use of that term, but is a characteristic,
like infancy, that may make it more difficult to prove the intent
element of battery. Our decision today does not create a special
rule for the elderly, but applies Colorado's intent requirement
in the context of a woman suffering the effects of Alzheimer's.
Id.

3

White proves that the Wagners' interpretation of Matheson, the Restatement, and
Tiede is based on current, valid principles of civil law.

It is important to note that the

Wagners are not arguing for a bright line rule that mentally disabled persons are never
capable of acting with intent, and therefore, their actions never constitute assault or battery.
Rather, as the court said in White, it is an issue for the jury. "Juries may find it difficult to
determine the mental state of an actor, but they may rely on circumstantial evidence

[A]

jury can examine the facts to conclude what another must have been thinking." Id, The
Wagners have only alleged that the mentally disabled person in this case lacked the requisite
intent, and on a motion to dismiss, that fact must be treated as though it were true. Whipple
v. University of Utah. 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996). To treat that fact as true, and still
hold that his acts constituted assault or battery, would be creating a special rule that anytime
a mentally disabled person's actions hurt another, it constitutes assault or battery, regardless
of intent.
II:

THE DEFINITION OF BATTERY FOR PURPOSES OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS THAT OF
MATHESON. THE RESTATEMENT, AND TIEDE.
REQUIRING INTENT TO HARM IN ADDITION TO INTENT
TO CAUSE A CONTACT.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not define assault or battery for purposes
of the act. Because the terms assault and battery are used, and they are legal terms, they
must be given their legal meaning. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (2000) (requiring that
terms in a statute, if they have a legal meaning, be given that meaning). They cannot be
given a layperson's meaning, like "attack" or "grab." They must be given the definitions of
civil assault and battery found in our case law. The definition of civil battery in Matheson.
the Restatement, and Tiede requires both an intent to cause a contact and an intent to harm.
4

It is not an objective standard; it is not a question of whether it looks like a battery. It is a
subjective standard; it is a question of what was intended.
It is true that Utah courts have "consistently granted immunity to governmental
entities for injuries that arise out of an assault or battery." Aple. Br. at 8. But that is a given.
The issue here is whether injuries arise out of an assault or battery when, because of mental
disability, the alleged assailant lacked the required intent. Utah courts have never addressed
that issue. The cases cited by the State are distinguishable for that reason.
The Utah Supreme Court did not reach that issue in Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855
P.2d 231 (Utah 1993), because the plaintiff did not raise it. The issue in Higgins was
whether government immunity applies to injuries arising from assault and battery when the
assailant is not a government employee. IcL at 240. Although the assailant was mentally ill,
it was undisputed that her actions constituted assault or battery. The plaintiff did not allege
that because of mental illness, the assailant was incapable of the required intent. On the
contrary, the plaintiff claimed that the assailant had been "brooding and planning to hurt [the
victim] for six months." Id. at 234. The Utah Supreme Court in Higgins did not rule
expressly or otherwise that mental condition and intent are irrelevant to whether an injury
arises out of an assault or battery.
That issue was not before the Utah Court of Appeals in Wright v. University of Utah.
876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), either.

The plaintiff in Wright alleged that a

government employee "assaulted and struck" her, and thereby admitted that her injuries
arose from assault or battery. IcL at 381. Only later, in response to a motion to dismiss, did
she claim that the assailant may have been mentally disabled and may not have formed the

5

required intent, but she never moved to amend her complaint. Id. at 384. The Court upheld
the trial court's dismissal of the action for that reason alone. I d at 384-85.
Although the Court discussed whether governmental immunity applies when the
assailant was mentally disabled and did not form the required intent, its discussion was
merely dicta as the issue was not before the court. The Court even stated, "We need not
address this issue." Id. at 384. The State argues that the discussion was not dicta because
the Court needed to address the issue of "whether the proposed amendment is "legally
insufficient.'" Aple. Br. at 10. But there was no proposed amendment. The plaintiff never
moved to amend her complaint. Therefore, the discussion of the issue in Wright is dicta and
not controlling.
Furthermore, the discussion should be disregarded because the reasoning behind it
is no longer valid. In its discussion, the Court relied on federal cases interpreting the Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., since the FTCA and the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act have identical language applying immunity to actions "arising
out of assault [or] battery," and therefore, it "may look to federal cases for guidance on
interpreting that section." IdL at 386 n. 11. But the FTCA cases relied on by the Court are
no longer a valid source for guidance. Although they have identical language, federal courts
have interpreted the FTCA fundamentally differently than Utah courts have interpreted the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The FTCA cases relied on by the Court in Wright all
involved an assault or battery by a government employee. Since those cases, the United
States Supreme Court confirmed in Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988), that the
FTCA only bars actions for injuries arising out of assault or battery by a government
employee.

6

Federal courts can define assault and battery broadly, without defeating the purposes
of the FTC A, because they apply the assault and battery basis for immunity narrowly, only
to assault and battery by governmental employees. In contrast, Utah courts do not limit the
assault and battery waiver of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to only assault and
battery by government employees. See Higgins. 855 P.2d 231. If the Wagner's action were
under the FTCA, there would be no immunity because Mr. Giese was not a government
employee. Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court in Sheridan reasoned that
[i]f the Government has a duty to prevent a foreseeable
dangerous individual from wandering about unattended, it
would be odd to assume that Congress intended a breach of that
duty to give rise to liability when the dangerous human
instrument was merely negligent but not when he or she was
malicious. In fact, the human characteristics of the dangerous
instrument are also beside the point. For the theory of liability
in this case is analogous to cases in which a person assumes
control of a vicious animal, or perhaps an explosive device.
Sheridan. 487 U.S. at 403.
The point is, Utah courts should not adopt part of the federal courts' interpretation
of the scope of immunity for assault and battery without adopting all of it. Since Utah courts
have not followed FTCA cases in limiting immunity to when the assailant is a government
employee, it should not follow FTCA cases regarding the intent required for assault and
battery.
If Utah courts do follow the FTCA cases at all, they should follow the FTCA cases
on the issue that are more consistent with Utah's established case law. One such case is
Moffitt v. United States. 430 F.Supp. 34 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). In Moffitt, the plaintiff alleged
that a mail carrier employed by the United States Postal Service "seized [her], threatened her
with a deadly weapon and proceeded to sexually assault her and abuse her." Id at 37. The

7

plaintiff also alleged that the mail carrier was "in a state of mental derangement." Id at 38.
In opposition to a motion to dismiss the plaintiff argued that there was a question of fact
regarding whether the mail carrier had the ability "to have control of his mental processes
necessary for the formation of the requisite mental element of intent required by definition
before an assault (or battery) can arise." IdL The court agreed that "there cannot be an
assault and battery . . . without a willful injury of the person upon whom the wrong is
inflicted. The word 'willful' means nothing more than intentional." Id at 37-38. It also
said, "It is obvious from the foregoing that this factual issue must be resolved by proof
before the Court can make a determination." Id 38. This is consistent with Matheson. the
Restatement, and Tiede. If Utah Courts follow any FTC A case, it should be Moffitt.
Ill:

UNDER EITHER STANDARD, THERE IS STILL A FACTUAL
ISSUE THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED ON A MOTION TO
DISMISS AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Even if only the intent to cause a contact is required, as the State claims, the Wagners
have raised the issue of whether Mr. Giese intended anything at all. As explained before,
intent, including the intent to cause a contact, is an inherently factual issue, to be decided by
the jury. "Where intent is an essential element of a claim or defense, it is error to dismiss the
claim as a matter of law under Rule 12(b)(6)." Richards Irrigation Company v. Karren.. 880
P.2d 6, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The State claims the "trial court found the attack was a
deliberate one." Aple Br. 6. On a motion to dismiss, however, the trial court cannot "find"
anything. The court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint and the reasonable
inferences from those allegations.
Wagners have alleged that Mr. Giese lacked the requisite intent. That includes both
that he lacked the intent to cause a contact and that he lacked the intent to harm. On a
8

motion for summary judgment, that would raise a factual issue precluding summary
judgment. On a motion to dismiss, that must be treated as though it were true. If it were true
that Mr. Giese lacked the requisite intent, governmental immunity would not apply, and the
case should not have been dismissed.

CONCLUSION
This Court should follow the controlling Utah case law, and not create a special rule
that anytime a mentally disabled person's actions hurt another, it constitutes battery,
regardless of intent. The Governmental Immunity Act, when interpreted according to
controlling Utah case law regarding the intent required for battery, does not bar the
Wagners' action. The Wagners respectfully request that the decision of the trial court be
reversed.
DATED this ^ ^ a v of August, 2003.

D. DAVID LAMBERT
c
LESLIE W.SLAUGH, and
HELEN H. ANDERSON, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
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